In mortgage markets with low concentration, lenders have an excessive propensity to foreclose defaulting mortgages. Though rational, foreclosure decisions by individual lenders may increase aggregate losses because they generate a pecuniary externality that causes house price drops and contagious strategic defaults. In concentrated markets, instead, lenders internalize the adverse e¤ects of mortgage foreclosures on local house prices and are more inclined to renegotiate defaulting mortgages. Thus, negative income shocks do not trigger strategic defaults, foreclosure rates are lower, and house prices less volatile. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the theory using U.S. counties during the 2007-2009 housing market collapse.
I Introduction
The recent collapse of the US housing market has been followed by a dramatic increase in mortgage defaults. Most often, mortgage lenders have reacted by foreclosing the homes of defaulting borrowers, instead of renegotiating their repayment schedule. Foreclosures have attracted a lot of attention in the media and the political debate, because of their social implications and the negative large drops in house prices they are associated to. But, setting aside the social implications, has the rate of foreclosure been too high? Put di¤erently, has the rate of foreclosure reduced or ampli…ed the impact of mortgage defaults on the aggregate losses of mortgage lenders? An answer to this question is important because if foreclosures increase the aggregate losses of the banking system, they may aggravate the negative …scal implications of bank bailouts. This paper explores these questions both theoretically and empirically.
Recent evidence shows that foreclosures are associated with price declines of neighboring houses (Campbell, Giglio and Pathak, 2011) . One view is that generalized price declines occur when poor maintenance of foreclosed properties a¤ect the quality of nearby houses (Harding, Rosenblatt, Yao, 2009 ). Another view is that price declines occur when foreclosures increase the supply of homes in illiquid markets. Foreclosures can also lead to contagious defaults not only because house price declines trigger further defaults by borrowers with negative home equity (Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt, 2010) , but also because foreclosures a¤ect the social norm regarding the repayment of mortgages (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011) .
In this paper, we argue that foreclosures create a pecuniary externality that may lead to contagious defaults, especially in markets with a less concentrated lending structure. We proceed in two steps. First, we present a simple model to illustrate how individual foreclosure decisions cause aggregate house price declines, and how incentives to foreclose are weaker in markets with a highly concentrated lending structure. Next, we use county level data on foreclosure and house prices in the U.S. to test the model's predictions.
In the model, defaults occur when idiosyncratic income shocks make borrowers unable to honor 2 their debt obligations. These liquidity defaults may lead to renegotiations or foreclosures depending on lenders'stakes in the local mortgage markets. When the provision of credit is dispersed, liquidation decisions are taken in isolation, and small (atomistic) lenders do not internalize the pecuniary externality that their liquidation decisions have on local housing prices. In these markets, liquidity defaults caused by shocks to borrowers'income are more likely to be followed by strategic defaults, because borrowers who can a¤ord to repay mortgages …nd it optimal to default if the value of their mortgages exceeds the value of their houses. Thus, defaults by distressed borrowers and strategic defaults depress house prices, leading to large aggregate losses for mortgage lenders.
In contrast, when the provision of mortgage credit is concentrated, lenders internalize the adverse e¤ects of liquidation decisions, strengthening their incentives to renegotiate defaulting loans.
More renegotiations cause foreclosure rates to fall, limiting strategic defaults and their adverse e¤ects on house prices.
To test the implications of this theory, we use di¤erences in mortgage lending concentration and housing price volatility in US counties during the 2007-2009 housing market collapse. By using county level data, we are able to focus on small geographical areas in which foreclosures are expected to have stronger spillovers on house prices. Consistent with the model's predictions, we …nd that during the recent period of market distress the volatility of house prices is signi…cantly lower in areas where the mortgage market is more concentrated. Between 2007 and 2009, house prices decrease more in counties experiencing a negative income shock, but the price changes are muted in areas where lenders hold larger shares of the local mortgage market. We estimate an elasticity of house price to negative income shocks of 0.06 in the least concentrated lending markets; this elasticity drops by half in counties with an index of market concentration evaluated at the cross-sectional median. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for standard local housing, income and demographic characteristics as well as for aggregate nationwide trends. The results are also robust to the use of alternative indexes of market concentration.
To validate the interpretation of these …ndings, we test two additional implications of our theory.
First, for a given market structure, banks have stronger incentives to renegotiate defaulting loans if the foreclosure procedure involves higher transaction costs. Consistent with this idea, we …nd that mortgage concentration reduces house price volatility to a large extent in non-judicial states, where foreclosures are less costly than in judicial states because lenders do not need to go through the courts to foreclose on a property. Second, since securitized mortgages are best thought as held by "atomistic" lenders, securitization tends to reduce market concentration. We show, however, that our main results are not driven by securitization, and the mechanism we highlight continues to hold even when we exclude securitized mortgages or control for the proportion of securitized mortgages in local markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the related literature. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data used in the paper and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents evidence supporting the mechanisms linking mortgage concentration to house prices volatility. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II Related Literature
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature exploring the role played by foreclosure laws in the collapse of housing prices during the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis. Mian, Su…, and Trebbi (2012) show that foreclosures are more frequent in states in which bankruptcy laws decrease the cost of foreclosing for the lender and that higher foreclosure rates lead to larger declines in housing prices. 1 Similarly to Mian, Su… and Trebbi (2011) , we also highlight the importance of the lenders'incentives to foreclose for house prices volatility. We propose, however, that the concentration of the local market for mortgages is important and that high dispersion in the provision of mortgages may bias foreclosure decisions and exacerbate price volatility.
Our paper is also related to the literature that stresses the role of securitization as an impediment to renegotiation. Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2010) and Agarwal et al (2011) argue, for example, that securitized loans are much less likely to be renegotiated and more likely to be foreclosed because dispersed ownership and potential agency frictions brought about by securitization of residential mortgages inhibit renegotiation of loans at risk of foreclosure. Adelino, Gerardi and Willen (2010a and b) , and Ghent (2011) question Piskorski, Seru and …ndings and provide evidence that securitization is unlikely to be the main reason why lenders are reluctant to renegotiate mortgages. Relative to this literature, we stress the independent role played by the mortgage market concentration structure. A low concentration in the local mortgage market can be brought about not only by the entry of a variety of mortgage lenders, but also by securitization.
There is also a large literature exploring the e¤ects of a concentrated banking systems on bank…rm relationships (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) and loan supply (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2006) . While these papers stress the e¤ects of market concentration on ex ante competition in the provision of credit and contract terms, to the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to highlight the role of market structure on lenders'liquidation incentives and on asset prices. In fact, the mechanism highlighted in this paper has bearings beyond the context of the housing market. It has implications for the price volatility of any collateralized market with dispersed lending structure. By showing that a market with dispersed lenders is more prone to …re sales, we also provide an alternative interpretation to the one existing in the literature (Keely (1990) ) that competition in the market for credit erodes …nancial stability because by lowering lenders'pro…ts, competition distorts their investment and risk-taking decisions.
Finally, the paper is related to a small literature that explores the role of government interventions in the presence of market externalities. Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) show that, in the presence of aggregate shocks, (unanticipated) government intervention that gives defaulting borrowers the option to continue to produce, increases the price of labor and makes the equilibrium more e¢ cient. We show that when the provision of mortgages is dispersed, foreclosure decisions may generate aggregate losses to the banking system because atomistic banks do not internalize the e¤ects of foreclosures on strategic defaults and house prices. In this context, government intervention favoring renegotiation is desirable.
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III Theory and Testable Implications
In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how defaults and foreclosures a¤ect house prices in markets with di¤erent mortgage lenders' concentration. The model also shows how the e¤ect of mortgage concentration depends on bankruptcy laws favoring liquidation over renegotiation of defaulting mortgages.
A The Model
A.1 Assumptions
The model has two time periods, t = 0; 1; and two goods: a divisible consumption good, c t ; and an indivisible housing good h t . There is a continuum of risk neutral households of mass 1, indexed by i; that value consumption and housing according to:
where c ti 0 is household i's consumption of the divisible good at time t, h it 2 f0; 1g is an indicator function that takes on the value of one for i's home ownership at time t and zero otherwise, and 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Households are heterogeneous in the utility they derive from home ownership. This is captured by the parameter, i ; which is uniformly distributed:
Households enter the …rst period with income, w 1 , and receive a random income w 2i in the second period. With probability q, the realization of this second-period endowment is w 2 . With probability 1 q; a fraction e of households receive #w 2 , with 0 < # < 1. The negative endowment shock is independently distributed from i . There is no rental market and thus owning is the only way to consume housing services (rental housing services can be thought to be part of the consumption good). Houses can be traded in both periods, and the house supply at each t is …xed at H.
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In the …rst period, households can …nance the purchase of a house with a one period mortgage, originated by a continuum of deep pocket investors of mass 1, called banks. Banks compete by o¤ering mortgages of size L; and repayment obligation B: The opportunity cost of extending a loan is L(1 + r); where r = 1=
1.
The …nal assumption is that households are wealthy enough to a¤ord a down-payment for the house, but too poor to save an amount su¢ cient to insure against the second period income shock. 2
Therefore, in the …rst period, households divide their period income, w 1 ; between consumption c 1i and the down-payment for the house, p 1 h 1i L; where p 1 is the house price in units of the numeraire consumption good, and L is the size of the mortgage loan. Their t = 1 budget constraint is:
implying that households never save. This is without loss of generality because linear utility and r = 1= 1 imply that any household is indi¤erent between consuming today and saving at the equilibrium interest rate.
In the second period, the budget constraint depends on the realization of the income shock and on whether households repay or default on their mortgages. In default, the budget constraint depends also on banks' decision to liquidate or renegotiate a mortgage contract. Speci…cally, if household i repays the mortgage, the t = 2 budget constraint is:
If, instead, household i defaults, and the bank agrees to renegotiate the contract accepting a payment equal to a fraction x of the loan repayment, the budget constraint is:
Finally, if household i defaults, the bank liquidates the contract and forecloses the house, the second-period budget constraint becomes:
Because households always have the option to default and surrender the house to banks, they prefer to default whenever,
which requires that the second period house price is su¢ ciently low.
A.2 Equilibrium housing prices and bank liquidation strategies
In the …rst period, the demand for housing is given by the following condition
Since i is uniformly distributed, the equilibrium price is pinned down by equating aggregate demand and supply:
In the second period, the equilibrium house price depends on the realization of the income shock.
When there is no shock, the equilibrium price is derived as before:
Instead, when a negative income shock occurs, defaults take place, and the equilibrium price depends on banks'decisions to renegotiate or liquidate defaulting loans. If banks renegotiate, households remain in possession of their house. As they will not be …nancing constrained, aggregate demand remains unchanged and the equilibrium house price, p SR 2 ; will be equal to the one prevailing in the state of the world with no income shocks:
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In contrast, when banks seize the houses and put them on the market, a fraction e of households becomes unable to participate in the housing market at t = 2 (we give the condition under which this is the case in equilibrium below). In this case, the market clearing condition becomes:
(1 e) ( p 2 ) = H;
and the equilibrium price is:
It follows immediately that p SL 2 is strictly lower than p SR 2 :
because households with high housing utility cannot participate in the market. As the aggregate demand is lower, the house price has to fall in order to clear the market.
A.3 Banks'contract, strategic default and aggregate losses
Given the second period equilibrium price under liquidation, p SL 2 ; competitive banks originate loans of size L; as long as they break-even on average, i.e.,
where the repayment obligations, B, cannot be higher that the equilibrium price with no shocks,
Otherwise, condition (1) holds and households always default.
Assuming that households always borrow as much as they can, the equilibrium loan size is:
which is a weighted average of the return to the lender in case of no default and default and liquidation. Since L < H , and the equilibrium price at t = 1, is:
The down payment has to be equal to
which is feasible, given the t = 1 budget constraint, if and only if
Also, since with liquidation some households have a utility loss for not being able to participate in the housing market, they might want to borrow less (or save to insure their consumption), to avoid liquidation. For simplicity, we rule out this possibility, i.e., the negative shock is too large for the household to be able to insure it through precautionary saving:
These two last conditions imply the following restrictions on the household income:
(1 + r) :
In the equilibrium in which banks liquidate the houses of defaulting borrowers, equation (2) implies that (1) holds, and thus even those households with a high second period income realization, prefer to default. This equilibrium with liquidation and default exists if and only if:
meaning that households that su¤er a negative shock are unable to participate in the housing market (the …rst inequality), while non distressed households default strategically and are able to repurchase a home from the bank at a lower price.
The above discussion can be summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 When defaulting loans are renegotiated, the equilibrium house price is the same as in absence of income shocks, and there are no strategic defaults. When defaulting loans are liquidated, households with high utility from housing cannot participate in the housing market. This causes the equilibrium price to drop, leading una¤ ected borrowers to default strategically.
A crucial assumption in Lemma 1 is that banks can distinguish between households that are hit by endownment shocks and households that are not. If this was not possible, una¤ected households could strategically ask for a loan modi…cation. Mortgage lenders'inability to distinguish between these two types of households is often been considered a determinants of lenders' reluctance to
renegotiate. In what follows, we assume that endowment shocks are observable even if not veri…able.
This assumption is supported by empirical evidence. For instance, in the foreclosure crisis that began around 2007, lenders had easy access to a wealth of informaton about households and should have been able to at least identify pools of households particularly likely to have experienced a negative shock and agree to modify those mortgage. 3
Since, in the equilibrium with strategic default,
the housing price is always larger than the payment that a bank can obtain in a renegotiation with a household hit by an income shock. It follows readily that for competitive banks it is always optimal to liquidate rather than to renegotiate.
Proposition 1 Atomistic banks always liquidate and never renegotiate with defaulting households.
Proposition 1 implies that banks that have only a small market share in the mortgage market always liquidate.
So far, we have shown that there exist an equilibrium in which competitive banks, which take housing prices as given, …nd it optimal to liquidate defaulting households'homes, even if this leads to strategic defaults. Hereafter, we show that even if for an atomistic bank it is individually rational to liquidate, the aggregate losses of the banking system could be lower with renegotiation.
This can be seen as follows. Since the mortgage repayment is B = H, the aggregate losses for the banking system, with renegotiation, are:
With liquidation, instead, all mortgages defaults, as households that are not hit by the shock default strategically. Thus, with liquidation, the aggregate losses for the banking system are:
Thus, renegotiation can reduce the aggregate losses of the banking system, even if renegotiation is not individually rational for an atomistic bank, when:
which is true if the housing stock, H, is relatively large and the fraction of households hit my the shock, e, relatively small, implying that the proportion of strategic defaults is relatively large.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Atomistic banks do not take into account the e¤ect of liquidation on house prices. Thus, if the housing stock, H, is relatively large, the housing price will have to drop by a large amount to bring the housing market back to equilibrium.
Moreover, as house prices drop, a large mass of households that did not experience the negative shock will default strategically. Relative to the equilibrium with renegotiation, banks that liquidate experience a smaller loss per mortgage, but cause more defaults. Since banks are atomistic, they do not internalize that their liquidation decisions, cause a drop in housing price and increase the number of mortgage defaults (on other banks).
A.4 Banking concentration, strategic defaults and house prices
We now remove the assumption that all banks are atomistic. In particular, we consider the case in which one of the mortgage providers is large and holds a fraction of the mortgage market at
Such a bank internalizes that its decision whether to liquidate or to renegotiate has an e¤ect on the aggregate demand for housing. If the bank liquidates, the aggregate demand for housing is identical to the one in the economy with atomistic banks derived above. If the large bank renegotiates, its borrowers will continue to participate in the housing market, and the aggregate housing demand is:
For ! 1, this aggregate demand, and the resulting equilibrium price, would be the same as the one prevailing when no income shock occurs. We would thus observe no strategic defaults. The large bank would have an incentive to renegotiate if doing so decreases the losses that it faces on its mortgage portfolio. This is the case if the following condition holds:
Thus, for ! 1, a monopolistic bank would always take the socially optimal decision and renegotiate if (3) holds. This would mitigate the e¤ect of negative income shocks on house prices.
Under the assumptions we made so far, if < 1, even if a large bank renegotiates, the other banks have even stronger incentives to liquidate as the house price is now higher. Thus, a "large" bank alone cannot prevent strategic defaults, although it mitigates the e¤ects of negative income shocks on house prices. However, if we more realistically introduce a cost of strategic defaults for the households, c, the model implies that banking concentration also reduces the extent of defaults and further reduces the e¤ects of negative shocks on house prices.
If a large bank renegotiates when the other atomistic banks liquidate, the equilibrium price at t = 2, when a negative shock occurs, is:
which is larger than p N S 2 . Furthermore, p N S0 2 increases in , the parameter capturing banking concentration. 4 We may think that banks still compete a la Bertrand if the market is contestable by potential entrants.
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Also,
is increasing in H. So mortgage provision concentration mitigates the e¤ects of negative shocks to a larger extent in areas in which the stock of housing is relatively larger with respect to the population. The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 2 The e¤ ect of negative shocks is ceteris paribus smaller in areas in which the provision of mortgages is more concentrated.
IV Empirical Evidence
The main prediction of the model is that mortgage lending concentration mitigates the e¤ect of negative income shocks on house prices volatility. In this section, we design an empirical strategy to test this prediction and investigate the mechanisms linking mortgage concentration to house prices volatility. We …rst describe the data, and our measures of lending concentration. We then present the empirical strategy and discuss the evidence in support of the model's predictions.
A Data sources
We combine a variety of data sources. To measure mortgage lending concentration in local markets, we use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires that depository and non-depository …nancial institutions that meet a speci…c asset level report information on mortgage applications, the loan disposition, including whether it is retained or securitized, and other characteristics that can be used to track lending trends (see, e.g., Mian and Su…, 2009; Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko, 2010; Favara and Imbs, 2011, Loustkina and Strahan, 2011) . HMDA is a comprehensive source of information on primary US mortgage originations, covering approximately 90% of the mortgage activity of banks, thrifts, credit unions, and mortgage companies.
As banks'propensity to foreclose or renegotiate mortgages in default may also depend on the mortgage law prevailing in the state where they operate, we gather information on bankruptcy procedures from RealtyTrac.com. This information is used to classify states depending on whether lenders must receive a judge's approval to foreclose (judicial foreclosure states) or not. From
RealtyTrac.com we also obtain information on the estimated number of days required to accomplish a foreclosure, to proxy for the overall cost of a foreclosure procedure.
We complement this data with local housing, income and demographic data. House price indexes are from Moody's Economy.com and Case-Shiller-Weiss. The former is a median house price index for existing single family properties; the latter measures housing prices holding quality constant.
The results in the paper are based on Moody's data, because it is available for a much larger cross 
B Measuring lending concentration
We use county level data to measure bank concentration. Although the standard de…nition of local banking market in the literature is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) (Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell, (1998), Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) , Black and Strahan (2002) ), we choose a measure of local banking market that is narrower than the MSA. We do so because we want to focus on geographical areas where foreclosures have stronger spillovers on housing prices.
The existing literature (see e.g., Campbell, Giglio and Pathak, 2011) has shown that the negative e¤ects of foreclosures on house prices operate more strongly within narrowly de…ned markets. There is also evidence that even for commercial real estate loans, banking markets are highly localized within counties (Garmaise and Maskowitz (2004) ). Moreover, a county-level de…nition of banking market allows us to use MSA-or even county-…xed e¤ects in our regressions, to control for other determinants of local mortgage markets and house prices.
Our measure of mortgage lending concentration is based on the model's prediction that concentration matters not for its ex ante e¤ects on contract terms, but for the way in which it a¤ects ex post the lenders' incentives to foreclose properties. Accordingly, we de…ne a proxy of concentration that measures a lender's exposure to the development of the local mortgage market. We …rst compute for each county an Her…ndahl index with market shares de…ned by the number of mortgage loans originated and retained by individual lenders in any 3-year period (i.e. 2004-2006, and 2007-2009) relative to the total number of loans originated in the same county over the same period. We choose a 3-year window because we want a measure of concentration de…ned in terms of the stock (not the ‡ow) of bank-held mortgages. Next, we assign to each lender only mortgages retained, because it is likely that losses associated to the default of securitized mortgages are not borne by the original lender but by the multitude of investors holding the securitized asset. 5 Thus, while the denominator of each lender's share in the local mortgage market includes both retained and securitized mortgages, the numerator includes only retained loans.
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we also compute two alternative indexes. The …rst one uses market shares based on the volume, instead of the number, of loans originated and retained, in order to capture the monetary exposure of lenders to local housing market developments. The second index computes the market shares excluding securitized mortgages from the denominator.
Since the fraction of loans securitized may di¤er across local markets, this index isolates the role of mortgage concentration from the one that securitization may independently play.
C Descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of roughly 1050 urban counties in continental US for which mortgage data is available. We focus on urban areas because house price dynamics, borrower characteristics, and mortgage lending decisions have di¤erent determinants in rural, often poor, areas. For each county, we aggregate HMDA data keeping track of the number and the dollar amount of conventional loans originated for the purchase of single-family, owner-occupied houses, as well as the fraction of these loans that are securitized. 6 This data is used to compute our di¤erent indexes of local market concentration. Table 2 The growth rate of income per capita displays comparable cross-sectional variation.
D Methodology
The main prediction of the model is that income shocks have a muted e¤ect on house prices in areas with more concentrated lenders. To test this prediction, we estimate variations of the following reduced form regression:
ln p c;t = 1 HHI c;t 1 + 2 1 ln y i;t <0 + 3 HHI c;t 1 1 ln y i;t <0 (5)
where c is an index for counties and t an index for the two subperiods, i.e. if a county experiences a negative income shock from one period to the next, and X c;t summarizes period-varying county speci…c controls. We also use period …xed e¤ects, t ; to partial out factors common to all counties in each subperiod, and MSA …xed e¤ects, M SA ; to ensure that omitted time-invariant factors for all counties in the same MSA are accounted for. Since there may be a common unobserved time-varying element to the regression error across all counties operating in the same MSA, we cluster standard errors at the MSA level.
In the speci…cation above, we use the Her…ndahl index measured in the three years preceding the interval in which we measure price changes. We do so to minimize concerns that housing market developments a¤ect the local market concentration. 7 In our analysis, however, this reverse causality argument is not a big concern. If concentration were driven by house price changes we would in fact expect that large shocks wipe out smaller lenders and increase concentration, inducing a downward bias in the estimates of our main variables of interest. In some robustness tests, we show that our results do not depend on the use of the predetermined value of the Her…ndahl index.
The vector of controls includes variables that account for county-level housing and economic conditions. These are the beginning of subperiod-t house price and income per capita, as well as the average per capita stock of single family houses, the average number of single family housing units sold, and the average unemployment rate. Some of these variables are predetermined, but none are truly exogenous. Their inclusion is only an attempt to ensure that our proxies for lending concentration matter, correcting for the usual house price determinants. Table 3 reports the results. The key variable of interest is the interaction term with coe¢ cient 3 :
E Results
Since the interaction term is constructed using a continuous measure of lending concentration, the coe¢ cient estimate provide a tight link between cross sectional variation in lending concentration and our model's comparative static results. The null hypothesis is that 2 < 0 and 3 > 0; meaning that a negative income shock causes house prices to decline, but this drop is less pronounced in areas with higher mortgage lending concentration.
Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of the baseline speci…cation (5) Columns 5 to 6 report the estimates of the same baseline speci…cation without MSA …xed e¤ects. We …nd that none of the coe¢ cients are a¤ected by this exclusion. Similar results obtain in column 7 and 8 where we use county …xed e¤ects, instead of MSA dummies. While the inclusion of these geographic dummies a¤ects some control variables, the estimates of the main coe¢ cient of interest are very robust, suggesting our results are not driven by unobservable local housing and lending factors.
In Table 4 we check the robustness of our main results to di¤erent measures of the mortgage concentration index. The …rst two columns use the period-t Her…ndahl index. As noted above, the benchmark speci…cation includes the predetermined value of this index, to minimize concerns of reverse causality. We …nd that using the current period index of concentration does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on the interaction term. The economic magnitude of the change in house prices following a negative income shock is comparable to the one based on the estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 .
Our theoretical model assume that lenders bear the credit risk on the loans they originate and retain. In reality, a large fraction of originated loans are securitized. If the e¤ect of concentration were to be entirely driven by securitization, there could be other channels, alternative to the one suggested by our model, that may explain our …ndings. For instance, securitized loans are managed by third-party mortgage servicers and thus likely to be serviced di¤erently from those kept on the balance sheet of the originating institution. 8 As argued by Piskorski, Seru, Vig (2010) and Agarwal et al, (2011) , dispersed ownership and agency problems brought about by securitization could weaken mortgage servicers'incentives to renegotiate mortgage contracts relative to bank-held loans.
To minimize the concern that securitized loans drive the relationship between our proxies for concentration and house prices, Columns 3 and 4 add the average securitization rate as an additional control. This is de…ned as the period-t county average fraction of loans originated and then securitized. As can be seen, none of the results are a¤ected by the inclusion of this additional control. Columns 5 and 6, explore further the role played by securitization. The baseline speci…cation is amended to include a measure of concentration based on market shares that exclude securitized loans from the computation of the total number or volume of loans originated in a county. Consistent with the results reported in the other columns, we …nd that counties hit by a negative income shock experience a drop in house prices but this e¤ect is mitigated in markets with a more concentrated mortgage provision. As in the benchmark speci…cation of Table 3 , we estimate that the drop in house price is reduced by half when a negative income shock is evaluated in markets with an index of lending concentration close to the sample average.
F Mortgage concentration and judicial foreclosure
In Table 3 and 4, equation (5) is estimated using pooled regressions after correcting for geographic, demographic, and economic determinants of house prices. The main concern with this analysis is that there may be an omitted factor that is correlated with both house prices and lending concentration, leading to inconsistent estimates of the coe¢ cients of interest.
Given the limitations of this exercise, we now exploit exogenous variations in state mortgage laws to provide additional evidence that lending concentration reduces the adverse e¤ect of income shocks on house prices. According to the model, lenders with larger market shares internalize more the e¤ects of foreclosures on house prices. A corollary of this prediction is that lending concentration should have a smaller e¤ect on house prices in areas where foreclosures on delinquent loans are less likely. To evaluate this additional prediction, we study the di¤erential e¤ect of market concentration on house prices in counties with di¤erent foreclosure procedures. In the U.S., some states requires that a foreclosed sale takes place through the court (judicial foreclosure states), while other states give lenders the automatic right to sell the property of the defaulting borrower (no-judicial foreclosure states). As discussed in Pence (2006) the …rst procedure imposes on lenders more costs and more lengthy foreclosure timelines. Accordingly, lenders' propensity to foreclose is likely to be lower in judicial foreclosure states. Mian, Su… and Trebbi (2012) …nd supportive evidence that foreclosures were twice as likely in non-judicial states during the recent US housing market collapse.
Building on this evidence, we re…ne our empirical strategy to allow the interaction term HHI c;t 1 1 ln y i;t <0 in equation (5) to vary with a dummy variable for judicial foreclosure states. Since states also di¤er in terms of the number of days it takes to seize a property from a delinquent borrower, we also use a dummy variable that is equal to one if the average length of time required to accomplish a foreclosure in a given state is larger than the cross-sectional median.
As in Mian, Su… and Trebbi (2012) , we focus only on the post-2006 housing collapse, and estimate a modi…ed version of equation (5) The results are in Table 5 . Estimates in columns 1 and 3 are based on the full sample of counties with available data. Columns 2 and 4 focus on a subsample of counties located in the same MSA, but straddling two or more state borders. By de…nition MSAs regroup counties with a high level of social and economic integration. Therefore, this subsample includes counties with di¤erent foreclosure laws, but likely to share observed and unobserved characteristics. Such a sample selection provide a rigorous way to minimize concerns of omitted variables in our regressions.
To conserve space, Table 5 
V Conclusion
We show that in mortgage markets with a dispersed lending structure, lenders exhibit an excessive propensity to foreclose because they do not internalize the e¤ects of foreclosures on house prices.
We provide micro-evidence supporting this mechanism using a sample of US counties during the recent housing market collapse. While a large fraction of mortgage loans are today securitized, and securitization contributes to make the provision of mortgages highly dispersed, we show that market concentration matters for house price volatility even if we use only loans that are kept on lenders'balance sheets. Thus, market concentration plays a role independently from securitization.
The mechanism highlighted in this paper has bearings beyond the context of the housing market. It has implications for the price volatility of any collateralized market with dispersed lending structure. We believe that exploring other areas in which the pecuniary externality we highlight may apply is an exciting area for future research. County level pooled regressions of the log change in house prices on the lagged Herfindahl index and its interaction with a dummy for negative income growth. Control variables include the beginning of period log house prices, the period average housing stock per capita, the period average number of housing units sold, the beginning of period log income, the period average unemployment rate and a time dummy for the period 2007-2009. All variables and sources are defined in Table 1 . Columns (3) and (4) include county dummies; columns (5) and (6) MSA dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level in columns (3) and (4) and at the MSA level in columns (5) and (6). Estimates followed by ***, **, and * are statistically different from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. 
Table 4 Robustness
County level pooled regressions of the log change in house prices on the Herfindahl index and its interaction with a dummy for negative income growth. Control variables include the beginning of period log house prices, the period average housing stock per capita, the period average number of housing units sold, the beginning of period log income, the period average unemployment rate, the period average securitization rate, and a time dummy for the period 2007-2009. All variables and sources are defined in Table 1 . All columns include MSA dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the MSA level. Estimates followed by ***, **, and * are statistically different from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 significance levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables: House price growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
